



HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY
INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTER

COUNTERING UAS THREATS IN THE HOMELAND

Current Threats and Emerging Technology

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UAS - CLASSIFICATION

Source: Army Corps of Engineers



UAS Group	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5
Representative UAS	Raven (RQ-11), WASP	ScanEagle	Shadow (RQ-7B), Tier II, STUAS	Fire Scout (MQ-8B, RQ-8B), Predator (MQ-1A/B), Sky Warrior ERMP (MQ-1C)	Reaper (MQ-9A) Global Hawk (Q-4) BAMS (RQ-4N)
Maximum Weight (lbs) (MGTOW)	0–20	21–55	< 1,320	> 1,320	> 1,320
Normal Operating Altitude (ft)	< 1,200 AGL	< 3,500 AGL	< FL 180	< FL 180	> FL 180
Speed (kts)	100	< 250	< 250	Any Speed	Any Speed

THREAT TRENDS

Global incidents show rogue drones have increased

Security Magazine, May 2022

“Wow, that was close.” Drone incidents on the rise

D.C. Airport Incident Exposes Gaps in Counter-Drone Authorities

Dayton Daily News, Jan 2019

Bloomberg Government, Jul 2022

Sex offenders using drones to target schools as criminal quadcopter use rises rapidly, police warn

Inews, Jul 2022

Your drone is interfering with Hawaii emergencies

KHON2, Jul 2022


EXCLUSIVE

Drones flying into NATO territory have forced the alliance to decide how to respond -- if at all -- to incidents inside its borders

CNN, Mar 2022

HDIAAC





123rf.com

LARGE UAS



DVIDS

SMALL UAS



123rf.com

SWARMS



123rf.com

SPRAYERS

Capable of long range and carrying weapons

DJI Matrice 300 RTK (19 lb)

Use of artificial intelligence/machine learning to operate drones

Used for farming applications

Unlikely to be used by bad actors but incredibly dangerous

Flyability Elios 2 (3.2 lb), designed to fly indoors

Designed to overwhelm traditional detection and countermeasure systems

Market research shows an increase in the agriculture drone market from \$200 million in 2020 to over \$2 billion in 2030

Intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance

Micro-UAS

Could be controlled by one person who may not be in the area where drones are operated

AVAILABILITY & SPEED



US Army

Many drones of varying levels of sophistication available for commercial purchase

Hobbyists can easily build drones from readily available parts

3D printing drones/ parts

Small, easy to acquire hobby jets, capable of sending drones over 200 mph

- Simple model jet engine, less than 3 in./70mm in diameter, available from \$369-\$459
- Larger model, 4 in./110 mm diameter, sold for \$2,420.98. (Made in China)

COMMUNICATIONS



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Longer range communications allowing for potentially longer flights

On-board guidance systems reduce jamming efficacy and potential for other outside interference. (e.g., a hockey-puck sized, 16 gram, inertial navigation system can be purchased online for \$1,350)

4G and 5G communications

- Drones can use cell phone communications for flight control
- This provides operators a BVLOS (beyond visual line of sight) capability
- "Flying drones on cellular networks, particularly 5G networks, is a viable option for delivering low-latency and high-performing applications." (DHS, 2021)

Categorizing UAS-Related Cyber Threats

DHS/ally UAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Disabling adversary networks through local interference• Harvesting adversary credentialing information• Data collection and probing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Spoofing of law enforcement UAS to misrepresent location information or collected probe data• Take-down, lock-out, or takeover of law enforcement UAS• Theft of UAS identity, network, or collected probe data
Adversarial and other UAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Botnet-style stealth network infection enabled by mobile UAS and poorly protected personal WiFi networks• Cascading infection of Internet of Things (e.g., home appliances, lightbulbs, car-charging stations) spread through mobile UAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Distorting or destroying collected probe data• Take-down, lock-out, or takeover of adversarial UAS
UAS as cyber weapons		UAS as cyberattack targets

Image Credit: HSOAC



EMERGING
IMPROVEMENTS:
BATTERIES



Vast research in private and public sector in battery tech.





Batteries are increasingly lighter, smaller, and store more energy.



Batteries can cause HAZMAT risks (Li-ion batteries).

EMERGING
IMPROVEMENTS:
**SIZE, WEIGHT,
& POWER**



Constantly evolving.



Advanced manufacturing techniques are leading to lighter and sturdier products.



Size ranges from micro- to large unmanned aerial vehicles that can carry materials.



COUNTER-UAS METHODOLOGY



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE





CISA



U.S. Air Force



DARPA

HOMELAND

HOST NATION

CONTINGENCY

- The burden of tactically detecting and identifying anomalous systems IVO US forces and facilities is responsibility of installation commander.
- Efforts ongoing to integrate small UAS into National Airspace System.
- Harmful RF, laser, microwave, etc., has the potential to affect civilians or property.

- HN environments have a diverse array of statutes and regulations.
- Operations in HNs must comply with local laws, obligations, treaties, or other requirements.
- Local commanders' authority to protect U.S. interest varies by location.

- Least restrictive, but most dangerous.
- U.S. and partners will employ UAS and manned aircraft, creating a highly congested but lesser controlled air domain.



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY





DETECT

A detection is a declaration that a UAS is in the presence of a sensor. Some systems, depending on how thresholds are configured, may report any object in its view as a detection (i.e., birds, commercial planes, etc.), or they may attempt to only alert the operator of objects deemed to be considered UAS, based on system capabilities and configuration.



LOCATE/ TRACK

A *location* is a static estimated report or display of where a ground control station (GCS) or UAV is located at a given moment. The display to the operator of the C-UAS technology can take on many forms, e.g., a heat map display, quadrant alert, or circle to indicate estimated center and location error or line of bearing (LOB).

A *track* is a compilation of location reports over a period of time. Tracks can be displayed for GCS and/or UAVs. Generally, it is displayed as a line or a sequence of dots.



CLASSIFY/ IDENTIFY

Classification is the assignment by the C-UAS technology (either autonomously or by an operator) of a potential target UAS to a high-level category such as UAS type, group, manufacturer and/or specific communication protocol.

Identification is the assignment by the C-UAS technology (either autonomously or by an operator) of a UAS to a more specific name or category, such as physical address of its modem, or the exact make/model of the UAS.

Note that the terms, classify and identify, are often used interchangeably, but can have different meanings for different audiences.



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MITIGATE

Mitigate is often used interchangeably with negate, interdict or neutralize. It describes the methods used to remove or reduce the threat posed by a UAS. These methods include technical means, such as RF or GPS jamming, spoofing/hijacking and kinetic attack; however, these technical methods are likely not legal for any entity other than DHS, DOJ, DOD or DOE to conduct. Mitigation may also include any capability or action associated with finding the sUAS operator and having that person safely land the sUAS, which would likely be permissible if the underlying detection system can be lawfully operated with Federal surveillance laws, as well as FCC and FAA regulatory standards and requirements.



COUNTER-UAS LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS:

*Federal Aviation
Administration*

FAA

Part 107

Commercial use, requires license.

Recreation use “carve out”

Recreational use, must register drones, optional safety test.

UAS are defined as an aircraft

The same as a commercial airline.

FAA can regulate the airspace above private property

Intrusion by air over another’s property may no longer be a trespass.

REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS:

*Federal Communications
Commission*

FCC



Jammers are illegal.



Can only be used by FEDERAL law enforcement under specific authorities (2017 and 2018 National Defense Authorization Act).



Jammers may interfere with others operating on the same frequency bands.

STATE & LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT



To be effective, state and local laws could focus on the operators

- Understand effective tactics to locate operators if a UAS is operating illegally
- Communicate with local community-based organizations (clubs) regarding appropriate drone use
- Means to detect, identify, and track drones are legal, provided they don't violate FCC/FAA rules



Work with local lawmakers to create effective statutes

- May limit drone operators from being in certain areas. Due to line-of-sight requirements, this limits the drones' flight area.



DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Detection Types

- Radar
- Electro-Optical (EO)
- Infrared (IR)
- EO/IR (combined)
- Radio Frequency (RF)
- Acoustic
- 5G



Photo Source: NSW Crane

D-Fend Solutions:
EnforceAir

Included for informational purposes only. Inclusion does not represent an endorsement by the Defense Technical Information Center or the U.S. Department of Defense

Identifies and Locates “Rogue drones”

Uses RF frequency detection

Locks onto drone signal

Takes over drone communications

This is not in line with FCC regulations for local/state law enforcement

Lands drone in predesignated safe zone

Fortem
Technologies:
TrueView®
Radar

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Low SWaP-C

Less than 15.5 lbs / 7 kg, uses 38 Watts

360 Degree view

AI at the Edge

Sorts out drones from "other noise"

Scalability

Can be linked together for contiguous view

Squarehead
Technology:
Discovair G2

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Acoustic Sensor

128 microphone array

Automated Target Detection

Claims "nearly zero false alarms"

Pinpoint Direction Accuracy to target

Sorts out drones from "other noise"

Works alone or with C2 system through API

QinetiQ:

Obsidian Counter Drone System

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Detect

3D radar with high accuracy position and quick refresh

Track and Identify

Combines radar with micro-doppler

AI

Minimize false alarms

Act

Continuously updated 3-D position allows for precise targeting

Opgal:

Accuracii XRU HD and Thermal Imaging PTZ

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Long range thermal imager

Low cost w/ thermal image stabilization

Ruggedized for Harsh Environments

Laser Range Finder

Deny data extraction from unauthorized users

Low Maintenance

Cobalt Solutions:

Urban Canyon Detection Tracking and Identification

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Sponsored by DHS SBIR

Awarded Phase II SBIR in September, 2021; in testing

Uses existing 5G base stations to detect and locate

Reduces need for costly equipment

Uses mmWave frequencies for high target resolution

Better accuracy than X-band radars

Coverage depends on 5G coverage in area

Limited in lower density areas

Terahertz Radar (for Stealth UAS)

Terahertz radar freq. (300GHz-3,000 GHz)

Up to 450m day and 300m night

Emits Photons

Ability to penetrate nonmetals

Precise, but short range

Penetrate skin and reflect off of metallic frame, but very small range

Promising Future technology

VHF and UHF Band Radar

Useful for stealth crafts

Can cover much of the sky

Frequency is low enough that the drone does not detect the radar waves


Imprecise location

INTEGRATION

DHS: C-UAS Interoperability Analysis: *Data/Object Model Layer Standards*

- Homeland Security Systems Engineering & Development Institute (HSSEDI) Report, released December 16, 2021
 - Key Findings
 - Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Standards
 - Cursor on Target (CoT)
 - Tactical Counter UAS Technologies (TCUT)
 - Universal Command and Control (UC2)
 - Radar Data Transmission
 - All Purpose Structured EUROCONTROL Surveillance Information Exchange (ASTERIX)
 - Motion Imagery Metadata
 - Motion Imagery Standards Board (MISB) suite of standards

NOTIONAL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE



What Does this Mean?

A fully functional, well designed CUAS system will be expensive.

DHS is working on interoperability standards, but no standard has been adopted yet.

SLTT organizations need to work with Federal partners to increase CUAS funding, coverage, and interoperability.



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HDAC



MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES

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DVIDS

JAMMING

Illegal for state and local law enforcement!

- RF jamming
- GNSS
- UAS function on the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz spectrum
- These are common frequencies for other kinds of equipment
- GNSS jamming may impact emergency services and transportation in the areas that use the L-band



DVIDS

ELECTROMAGNETIC

- THOR
- AUDS
- Leonidas
- MAUI
- Drone Guard
- DroneDefender
- MESMER
- Silent Archer
- CORIAN

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SPOOFING

- Take control of UAS C2.
- Illegal, even for law enforcement
- Usually results in the UAS landing



DVIDS

KINETIC EFFECTS

Illegal for state and local law enforcement!

- Cannot destroy UAS in the air; aircraft according to FAA rules
- Follow to land, usually near operator
- Danger of collateral damage



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